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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of estimating a potentially sensitive (individually
stigmatizing) statistic on a population. In our model, individuals are concerned about their
privacy, and experience some cost as a function of their privacy loss. Nevertheless, they would
be willing to participate in the survey if they were compensated for their privacy cost. These
cost functions are not publicly known, however, nor do we make Bayesian assumptions about
their form or distribution. Individuals are rational and will misreport their costs for privacy if
doing so is in their best interest. Ghosh and Roth recently showed in this setting, when costs
for privacy loss may be correlated with private types, if individuals value differential privacy,
no individually rational direct revelation mechanism can compute any non-trivial estimate of
the population statistic. In this paper, we circumvent this impossibility result by proposing a
modified notion of how individuals experience cost as a function of their privacy loss, and by
giving a mechanism which does not operate by direct revelation. Instead, our mechanism has the
ability to randomly approach individuals from a population and offer them a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. This is intended to model the abilities of a surveyor who may stand on a street corner
and approach passers-by.
1 Introduction
Suppose you are a researcher and you would like to collect data from a population and perform an
analysis on it. Presumably, you would like your sample, or at least your analysis, to be represen-
tative of the underlying population. Unfortunately, individuals’ decisions of whether to participate
in your study may skew your data: perhaps people with an embarrassing medical condition are less
likely to respond to a survey whose results might reveal their condition.
One could try to incentivize participation by offering a reward for participation, but this only
serves to skew the survey in favor of those who value the reward over the costs of participating (e.g.,
hassle, time, detrimental effects of what the study might reveal), which again may not result in a
representative sample. Ideally, you would like to be able to find out exactly how much you would
have to pay each individual to participate in your survey (her “value”, akin to a reservation price),
and offer her exactly that much. Unfortunately, traditional mechanisms for eliciting player values
truthfully are not a good match for this setting because a player’s value may be correlated with her
∗Computing and Mathematical Sciences and Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech. Email:
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private information (for example, individuals with an embarrassing medical condition might want
to be paid extra in order to reveal it). Standard mechanisms based on the revelation principle are
therefore no longer truthful. In fact, Ghosh and Roth [GR11] showed that when participation costs
can be arbitrarily correlated with private data, no direct revelation mechanism can simultaneously
offer non-trivial accuracy guarantees and be individually rational for agents who value their privacy.
Voluntarily provided data is a cornerstone of medical studies, opinion polls, human subjects
research, and marketing studies. Some data collectors, such as the US Census, can get around the
issue of voluntary participation by legal mandate, but this is rare. How might we still get analyses
that represent the underlying population?
Statisticians and econometricians have of course attempted to address selection and non-response
bias issues. One approach is to assume that the effect of unobserved variables has mean zero. The
Nobel-prize-winning Heckman correction method [Hec79] and the related literature instead attempt
to correct for non-random samples by formulating a theory for the probabilities of the unobserved
variables and using the theorized distribution to extrapolate a corrected sample. The limitations of
these approaches is precisely in the assumptions they make on the structure of the data. Is it possi-
ble to address these issues without needing to “correct” the observed sample, while simultaneously
minimizing the cost of running the survey?
1.1 Contributions
The present paper provides a new model for incentivizing participation in data analyses when
the subjects’ value for their private information may be correlated with the sensitive information
itself. In this model, we present a mechanism for eliciting responses that allows us to compute
accurate statistical estimates, addressing the survey problem described above. We model costs for
individual’s participation using the tools and language of differential privacy; our mechanisms are
not specific to user costs defined in terms of differential privacy, but offering guarantees of this type
can significantly decrease costs when compared to mechanisms that ask for unrestricted access to
user data.
Of course a second issue beyond representative participation is truthful participation. We require
that rational agents be positively incentivized to participate in our mechanism, but once we get their
participation, there is the question of whether they will answer the survey question correctly. One
solution is to assume that survey responses are verifiable or cannot easily be fabricated (e.g., the
surveyor requires documentation of answers, or, more invasively, actually collects a blood sample
from the participant). While the approach we present in this paper works well with such verifiable
responses, in addition, our framework provides a formal “almost-truthfulness” guarantee, that the
expected utility a participant could gain by lying in the survey is at most very small. Note that
this is a different issue than participation, which is voluntary and always strictly incentivized.
1.2 Differential Privacy
Over the past decade, differential privacy has emerged as a compelling privacy definition, and has
received considerable attention. While we provide formal definitions in Section 2, differential privacy
essentially bounds the sensitivity of an algorithm’s output to arbitrary changes in individual’s data.
In particular, it requires that the probability of any possible outcome of a computation be insensitive
to the addition or removal of one person’s data from the input. Among differential privacy’s many
strengths are (1) that differentially private computations are approximately truthful [MT07] (which
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gives the almost-truthfulness guarantee mentioned above), and (2) that differential privacy is a
property of the mechanism and is independent of the input to the mechanism.
How Individuals Should Value Privacy: The “Paradox” of Differential Privacy A
natural approach taken by past work (e.g., [GR11]) in attempting to model the cost incurred by
participants in some computation on their private data is to model individuals as experiencing cost
as a function of the differential privacy parameter ε associated with the mechanism using their
data. We argue here, however, that modeling an individual’s cost for privacy loss solely as any
function f(ε) of the privacy parameter ε would lead to unnatural agent behavior and incentives.
Consider an individual who is approached on a street corner and offered a deal: she can par-
ticipate in a survey in exchange for $100, or she can decline to participate and walk away. She
is given the guarantee that both her participation decision and her input to the survey (if she
opts to participate) will be treated in an ε-differentially private manner. In the usual language of
differential privacy, what does this mean? Formally, her input to the mechanism will be the tuple
containing her participation decision and her private type. If she decides not to participate, the
mechanism output is not allowed to depend on her private type, and switching her participation
decision to “yes” cannot change the probability of any outcome by more than a small multiplicative
factor. Similarly, fixing her participation decision as “yes”, any change in her stated type can only
change the probability of any outcome by a small multiplicative factor.
How should she respond to this offer? A natural conjecture is that she would experience a
higher privacy cost for participating in the survey than not (after all, if she does not participate,
her private type has no effect on the output of the mechanism – she need not even have provided
it), and that she should weigh that privacy cost against the payment offered, and make her decision
accordingly.
However, if her privacy cost is solely some function f(ε) of the privacy parameter of the mech-
anism, she is actually incentivized to behave quite differently. Since the privacy parameter ε is
independent of her input, her cost f(ε) will be identical whether she participates or not. Indeed,
her participation decision does not affect her privacy cost, and only affects whether she receives
payment or not, and so she will always opt to participate in exchange for any positive payment.
Further, she experiences the full privacy cost of the mechanism simply by being asked whether she
wishes to participate in the survey, even if her private data is never used!
We view this as problematic and as not modeling the true decision-making process of individuals:
in reality, the full privacy cost of a survey may not have been experienced by the individual before
her data has been given. Furthermore, individuals are unlikely to accept arbitrarily low offers for
their private data. One potential route to addressing this “paradox” would be to move away from
modeling the value of privacy solely in terms of an input-independent privacy guarantee. This
is the approach taken by [CCK+11]. Instead, we retain the framework of differential privacy, but
introduce a new model for how individuals reason about the cost of privacy loss. Roughly, we model
individuals’ costs as a function of the differential privacy parameter of the portion of the mechanism
they participate in, and assume they do not experience cost from the parts of the mechanism that
process data that they have not provided (or that have no dependence on their data). For our
application, we consider mechanisms that operate in two stages: first, they aggregate participation
decisions by making take-it-or-leave-it offers, but do not compute on the private types collected
from the participating individuals. The “output” of this stage of the mechanism is the observed
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behavior of the surveyor: the number of people approached and the prices offered.1 The second
stage of the mechanism takes as input the reported private types of the individuals who elected to
participate. In our model, individuals who declined to provide their private types do not experience
any cost in this second stage of the mechanism.
1.3 Related Work
In recent years, differential privacy, which was introduced in a series of papers [DMNS06, BDMN05],
has emerged as the standard solution concept for privacy in the theoretical computer science liter-
ature. There is by now a very large literature on this fascinating topic, which we do not attempt
to survey here, instead referring the interested reader to a survey by Dwork [Dwo08].
McSherry and Talwar proposed that differential privacy could itself be used as a solution concept
in mechanism design [MT07]. They observed that any differentially private mechanism is approxi-
mately truthful, while simultaneously having some resilience to collusion. Using differential privacy
as a solution concept (as opposed to dominant strategy truthfulness) they gave some improved
results in a variety of auction settings. Gupta et al. also used differential privacy as a solution
concept in auction design [GLM+10].
This literature was recently extended by a series of elegant papers by Nissim, Smorodinsky,
and Tennenholtz [NST12], Xiao [Xia11], Nissim, Orlandi, and Smorodinsky [NOS11], and Chen et
al. [CCK+11]. This line of work observes ([NST12, Xia11]) that differential privacy does not lead
to exactly truthful mechanisms, and indeed that manipulations might be easy to find, and then
seeks to design mechanisms that are exactly truthful even when agents explicitly value privacy
([Xia11, NOS11, CCK+11]).
Feigenbaum, Jaggard, and Schapira considered (using a different notion of privacy) how the
implementation of an auction can affect how many bits of information are leaked about individuals’
bids [FJS10]. Specifically, they study to what extent information must be leaked in second price
auctions and in the millionaires problem. We consider somewhat orthogonal notions of privacy and
implementation that make our results incomparable.
Most related to this paper is an orthogonal direction initiated by Ghosh and Roth [GR11].
Ghosh and Roth consider the problem of a data analyst who wishes to buy data from a population
for the purposes of computing an accurate estimate of some population statistic. Individuals
experience cost as a function of their privacy loss (as measured by differential privacy), and must
be incentivized by a truthful mechanism to report their true costs. In particular, [GR11] show
that if individuals experience disutility as a function of differential privacy, and if costs for privacy
can be arbitrarily correlated with private types, then no individually rational direct revelation
mechanism can achieve any nontrivial accuracy. In this paper, we overcome this impossibility
result by abandoning the direct revelation model in favor of a model in which a surveyor can
approach random individuals from the population and offer them take-it-or-leave-it offers, and by
introducing a slightly different model for how individuals experience cost as a function of privacy.
We note that the conversation on how individuals should experience costs as a function of privacy is
ongoing. Ghosh and Roth [GR11] suggest that privacy costs should be a function of the differential
privacy parameter of the mechanism; [Xia11] suggest that such costs should be a function of the
mutual information between the agent type and the mechanism output (such a measure requires a
1For clarity, in our analysis, we also include as part of the output of this stage a noisy (privacy-preserving) count
of the number of people accepting the highest offer we make.
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prior on player types); Nissim, Orlandi, and Smorodinsky suggest that agent costs should merely be
upper bounded by a linear function of the privacy parameter of the mechanism [NOS11]; and Chen
et al. [CCK+11] suggest that the appropriate measure should be outcome dependent (although
inspired by differential privacy). The model in this paper adds to this fruitful conversation.
Concurrently with this work, Roth and Schoenebeck [RS12] consider the problem of deriving
Bayesian optimal survey mechanisms for computing minimum variance unbiased estimators of a
population statistic from individuals who have costs for participating in the survey. Although the
motivation of this work is similar, the results are orthogonal. In this paper, we take a prior-free
approach and model costs for private access to data using the formalism of differential privacy. In
contrast, [RS12] takes a Bayesian approach, assuming a known prior over agent costs, and does
not attempt to provide any privacy guarantee, and instead only seeks to pay individuals for their
participation.
Also contemporaneously with this work, Fleischer and Lyu [FL12] consider the problem of
computing a statistic over a population where privacy costs may be correlated with private types.
Their approach is fundamentally different from ours, however, because they crucially assume the
surveyor has perfect knowledge of the correlation between types and costs. In the present work, we
make no such Bayesian assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
The approach to modeling privacy that we use is the by-now-standard model of differential privacy.
We think of databases as being an ordered multiset of elements from some universe X: D ∈ X∗
in which each element corresponds to the data of a different individual. We call two databases
neighbors if they differ in the data of only a single individual.
Definition 2.1. Two databases of size n D,D′ ∈ Xn are neighbors with respect to individual i if
for all j 6= i ∈ [n], Dj = D
′
j .
We can now define differential privacy. Intuitively, differential privacy promises that the output
of a mechanism does not depend too much on any single individual’s data.
Definition 2.2 ([DMNS06]). A randomized algorithm A which takes as input a database D ∈
X∗ and outputs an element of some arbitrary range R is εi-differentially private with respect to
individual i if for all databases D,D′ ∈ X∗ that are neighbors with respect to individual i, and for
all subsets of the range S ⊆ R, we have:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(εi)Pr[A(D
′) ∈ S]
A is εi-minimally differentially private with respect to individual i if εi = inf(ε ≥ 0) such that A is
ε-differentially private with respect to individual i. When it is clear from context, we will simply
write εi-differentially private to mean εi-minimally differentially private.
A simple and useful fact is that post-processing does not affect differential privacy guarantees.
Fact 2.1. Let A : X∗ → R be a randomized algorithm which is εi-differentially private with respect
to individual i, and let f : R→ T be an arbitrary (possibly randomized) function mapping the range
of A to some abstract range T . Then the composition g ◦ f : X∗ → T is εi-differentially private
with respect to individual i.
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A useful distribution is the Laplace distribution.
Definition 2.3 (The Laplace Distribution). The Laplace Distribution with mean 0 and scale b
is the distribution with probability density function: Lap(x|b) = 12b exp(−
|x|
b ). We will sometimes
write Lap(b) to denote the Laplace distribution with scale b, and will sometimes abuse notation
and write Lap(b) simply to denote a random variable X ∼ Lap(b).
A fundamental result in data privacy is that perturbing low sensitivity queries with Laplace
noise preserves ε-differential privacy.
Theorem 2.1 ([DMNS06]). Suppose f : X∗ → Rk is a function such that for all adjacent databases
D and D′, ||f(D)−f(D′)||1 ≤ 1. Then the procedure which on input D releases f(D)+(X1, . . . ,Xk),
where each Xi is an independent draw from a Lap(1/ε) distribution, preserves ε-differential privacy.
We consider a (possibly infinite) collection of individuals drawn from some distribution over
types D. There exists a finite collection of private types T . Each individual is described by a
private type ti ∈ T , as well as a nondecreasing cost function ci : R+ → R+ that measures her
disutility ci(εi) for having her private type used in a computation with a guarantee of εi-differential
privacy.
Agents interact with the mechanism as follows. The mechanism will be endowed with the ability
to select an individual i uniformly at random (without replacement) from D, by making a call to a
population oracle OD. Once an individual i has been sampled, the mechanism can present i with a
take-it-or-leave-it offer, which is a tuple (pi, ε
1
i , ε
2
i ) ∈ R
3
+. pi represents an offered payment, and ε
1
i
and ε2i represent two privacy parameters. The agent then makes her participation decision, which
consists of one of two actions: she can accept the offer, or she can reject the offer. If she accepts
the offer, she communicates her (verifiable) private type ti to the auctioneer, who may use it in
a computation which is ε2i -differentially private with respect to agent i. In exchange she receives
payment pi. If she rejects the offer, she need not communicate her type, and receives no payment.
Moreover, the mechanism guarantees that the bit representing whether or not agent i accepts the
offer is used only in an ε1i -differentially private way, regardless of her participation decision.
2.1 How Cost Functions Relate to Types
We model agents as caring only about the privacy of their private type ti, but they may also
experience a cost when information about their cost function ci(εi) is revealed—because of possible
correlations between costs and types. To capture this phenomenon while still avoiding making
Bayesian assumptions, we take the following approach.
Implicitly, there is some (possibly randomized) process fi which maps a user’s private type t to
his cost function ci = fi(t), but we make no assumption about the form of this map. This takes
a worst case view – i.e., we have no prior over individuals’ cost functions. For point of reference,
in a Bayesian model, the function f would represent the user’s marginal distribution over costs
conditioned on its type. We make no Bayesian assumptions, but introduce this function f so as to
formalize our model of utility for privacy, which is crucial to the results we give in this paper.
When an individual i is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it offer, her type is used in two compu-
tations: first, her participation decision (which may be a function of her type) is used in some
computation A1 which will be ε
1
i -differentially private. Then, if she accepts the offer, she allows
her type to be used in some computation A2 which may be ε
2
i -differentially private.
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We model individuals as caring about the privacy of their cost function only insofar as it reveals
information about their private type. Because their cost function is determined as a function of
their private type, if P is some predicate over cost functions, if P (ci) = P (fi(ti)) is used in a way
that guarantees εi-differential privacy, then the agent experiences a privacy loss of some ε
′
i ≤ εi
(which corresponds to a disutility of some ci(ε
′
i) ≤ ci(εi)). We write gi(εi) = ε
′
i to denote this
correspondence between a given privacy level and the effective privacy loss due to use of the cost
function at that level of privacy. For example, if fi is a deterministic injective mapping, then fi(ti)
is as disclosive as ti and so gi(εi) = εi. On the other hand, if fi produces a distribution independent
of the user’s type, then gi(εi) = 0 for all εi.
We note that the cost function model we describe here can also incorporate other costs of
participating in a survey not related to privacy concerns, such as valuing time or disliking talking
to strangers. One can fold in such considerations (which contribute constant factors independent
of the privacy parameter) without changing our model or the qualitative nature of our results, but
such a change might result in nonlinear cost functions, violating a simplifying assumption made in
the analysis of our mechanism’s cost.
2.2 Cost Experienced from a Take-It-Or-Leave-It Mechanism
Definition 2.4. A Private Take-It-Or-Leave-It Mechanism is composed of two algorithms, A1 and
A2. A1 makes offer (pi, ε
1
i , ε
2
i ) to individual i and receives a binary participation decision. If player
i participates, she receives a payment of pi in exchange for her private type ti. A1 performs no
computation on ti. The privacy parameter ε
1
i for A1 is computed by viewing the input to A1 to be
the vector of participation decisions, and the output to be the number of individuals to whom offers
were made, the offers (pi, ε
1
i , ε
2
i ), and an ε
1
i -differentially private count of the number of players who
chose to participate at the highest price we offer.
Following the termination of A1, a separate algorithm A2 computes on the reported private
types of these participating individuals and outputs a real number ŝ. The privacy parameter ε2i of
A2 is computed by viewing the input to be the private types of the participating agents, and the
output as ŝ.
We assume that agents have quasilinear utility (cost) functions: given a payment pi, an agent
i who declines a take-it-or-leave-it offer (and thus receives no payment) and whose participation
decision is used in an ε1i -differentially private way experiences utility ui = −ci(gi(ε
1
i )) ≥ −ci(ε
1
i ).
An agent who accepts a take-it-or-leave-it offer and receives payment p, whose participation decision
is used in an ε1i -differentially private way, and whose private type is subsequently used in an ε
2
i -
differentially private way experiences utility ui = pi − ci(ε
2
i + gi(ε
1
i ) ≥ pi − ci(ε
2
i + ε
1
i ).
Remark 2.1. While this model of costs, including the function gi, might seem complex, note that
it captures the correct cost model in a number of situations. Suppose, for example, that costs have
correlation 1 with types, and ci(ε) = ∞ if and only if ti = 1, otherwise ci(ε) ≪ pi. Then, asking
whether an agent wishes to accept an offer (pi, εi, εi) is equivalent to asking whether ti = 1 or
not, and those accepting the offer are in effect answering this question twice. In this case, we have
gi(ε) = ε. On the other hand, if types and costs are completely uncorrelated, then there is no privacy
loss associated with responding to a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This is captured by setting gi(ε) = 0.
Note that by accepting an offer, agent i achieves utility at least
pi − ci(ε
2
i + gi(ε
1
i )) ≥ pi − ci(ε
2
i + ε
1
i ).
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By rejecting an offer, agent i might achieve negative utility, bounded by:
0 ≥ −ci(gi(ε
1
i )) ≥ −ci(ε
1
i ).
Agents wish to maximize their utility, and so the following lemma is immediate:
Lemma 2.2. A utility-maximizing agent i will accept a take-it-or-leave-it offer (pi, ε
1
i , ε
2
i ) when
pi ≥ ci(ε
1
i + ε
2
i )
Proof. We simply compare the lower bound on an agent’s utility when accepting an offer with an
upper bound on an agent’s utility when rejecting an offer to find that agent i will always accept
when
pi − ci(ε
1
i + ε
2
i ) ≥ 0.
Remark 2.2. Note that this lemma is tight exactly when agent types are uncorrelated with agent
costs – i.e., when gi(ε) = 0. When agent types are highly correlated with costs, then rejecting an
offer becomes more costly, and agents may accept take-it-or-leave-it offers at lower prices.
We make no claims about how agents respond to offers (pi, ε
1
i , ε
2
i ) for which pi < ci(ε
1
i + ε
2
i ).
Note that since agents can suffer negative utility even by rejecting offers, it is possible that they
will accept offers that lead to experiencing negative utility. Thus, in our setting, take-it-or-leave-it
offers are not necessarily truthful in the standard sense. Nevertheless, Lemma 2.2 will provide a
strong enough guarantee for us of one-sided truthfulness: we can guarantee that rational agents
will accept all offers that guarantee them non-negative utility.
Note that our mechanisms will satisfy only a relaxed notion of individual rationality : we have
not endowed agents with the ability to avoid having been given a take-it-or-leave it offer, even if
both options (taking or rejecting) would leave her with negative utility. Agents who reject take-it-
or-leave-it offers can experience negative utility in our mechanism because their rejection decision
is observed and used in a (differentially private) computation. Once the take-it-or-leave-it offer
has been presented, agents are free to behave selfishly. We feel that both of these relaxations
(of truthfulness and individual rationality) are well motivated by real world mechanisms in which
surveyors may approach individuals in public, and crucially, they are necessary in overcoming the
impossibility result in [GR11].
Most of our analysis holds for arbitrary cost functions ci, but we do a benchmark cost comparison
assuming linear utility functions of the form ci(ε) = viε, for some quantity vi.
2.3 Accuracy
Our mechanism is designed to be used by a data analyst who wishes to compute some statistic
about the private type distribution of the population. Specifically, the analyst gives the mechanism
some function Q : T → [0, 1], and wishes to compute a = Eti∼D[Q(ti)], the average value that Q
takes among the population of agents D. The analyst wishes to obtain an accurate answer, defined
as follows:
Definition 2.5. A randomized algorithm, given as input access to a population oracle OD which
outputs an estimate M(OD) = â of a statistic a = Eti∼D[Q(ti)] is α-accurate if:
Pr[|â− a| > α] <
1
3
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where the probability is taken over the internal randomness of the algorithm and the randomness
of the population oracle.
The constant 13 is arbitrary, and is fixed only for convenience. It can be replaced with any other
constant value without qualitatively affecting any of the results in this paper.
2.4 Cost
We will evaluate the cost incurred by our mechanism using a bi-criteria benchmark: For a parametriza-
tion of our mechanism which gives accuracy α, we will compare our mechanism’s cost to a bench-
mark algorithm that has perfect knowledge of each individual’s cost function, but is constrained
to make every individual the same take-it-or-leave-it offer (the same fixed price is offered to each
person in exchange for some fixed ε′-differentially private computation on her private type) while
obtaining α/32 accuracy.2 That is, the benchmark mechanism must be “envy-free”, and may ob-
tain better accuracy than we do, but only by a constant factor. On the other hand, the benchmark
mechanism has several advantages: it has full knowledge of each player’s cost, and need not be
concerned about sample error. For simplicity, we will state our benchmark results in terms of
individuals with linear cost functions.
3 Mechanism and Analysis
3.1 The Take-It-Or-Leave-It Mechanism
In this section we describe our mechanism, which we present in Figure 1. It is not a direct revelation
mechanism, and instead is based on the ability to present take-it-or-leave-it offers to uniformly
randomly selected individuals from some population. This is intended to model the scenario in
which a surveyor is able to stand in a public location and ask questions or present offers to passers
by (who are assumed to arrive randomly). Those passing the surveyor have the freedom to accept
or reject the offer that they are presented, but they cannot avoid having the question posed to
them.
Our mechanism consists of two algorithms. Algorithm A1 is run on samples from the population
with privacy guarantee ε0, until it terminates at some final epoch ĵ; and then algorithm A2 is run
on (AcceptedSetĵ ,EpochSize(ĵ), ε0).
3.2 Privacy
Note that our mechanism offers the same ε0 in every take-it-or-leave-it offer it makes.
Theorem 3.1. The Harassment Mechanism is ε0-differentially private with respect to the partici-
pation decision of each individual approached.
Proof. The observable output of A1 is the total number of people approached, the payments offered,
and the noisy count of the number of number of players who accepted the offer in the final epoch.
The first two of these are functions only of the choice of the final epoch j at which the algorithm
2Note that we have made no attempt to optimize the constant.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm A1, the “Harassment Mechanism”. It is parametrized by an accuracy
level α, and we view its input to be the participation decision of each individual approached with a
take-it-or-leave-it offer, and its observable output to be the number of individuals approached, the
payments offered, and the noisy count of the number of players who accepted the offer in the final
epoch.
Let EpochSize(j)← 100(log j+1)
α2
.
Let j ← 1.
Let ε0 = α
while TRUE do
Let AcceptedSetj ← ∅ and NumberAcceptedj ← 0 and Epochj ← ∅
for i = 1 to EpochSize(j) do
Sample a new individual xi from D.
Let Epochj ← Epochj ∪ {xi}.
Offer xi the take-it-or-leave it offer (pj , ε0, ε0) with pj = (1 + η)
j
if i accepts then
Let AcceptedSetj ← AcceptedSetj ∪ {xi} and
NumberAcceptedj ← NumberAcceptedj + 1.
Let νj ∼ Lap(1/ε0) and NoisyCountj = NumberAcceptedj + νj
if NoisyCountj ≥ (1− α/8)EpochSize(j) then
Call Estimate(AcceptedSetj ,EpochSize(j), ε0).
else
Let j ← j + 1
Algorithm 2 The Estimation Mechanism. We view its inputs to be the private types of each
participating individual from the final epoch, and its output is a single numeric estimate.
Estimate(AcceptedSet,EpochSize, ε):
Let â =
∑
xi∈AcceptedSet
Q(xi) + Lap(1/ε)
Output â/EpochSize.
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halts. But this decision is made as a function only of the quantity NoisyCountj, which preserves
ε0-differential privacy by the properties of the Laplace mechanism, and the fact that the vector
(NumberAccepted1, . . . ,NumberAcceptedj)
has sensitivity 1.
Theorem 3.2. The Estimation Mechanism is ε0-differentially private with respect to the partici-
pation decision and private type of each individual approached.
Proof. The theorem follows directly from the privacy of the Laplace mechanism.
Note that these two theorems, together with Lemma 2.2, imply that each agent will accept its
take-it-or-leave-it offer of (pj , ε0, ε0) whenever pj ≥ ci(2ε0).
3.3 Accuracy
Theorem 3.3. Our overall mechanism, which first runs the Harassment Mechanism and then hands
the types of the accepting players from the final epoch to the Estimation Mechanism, is α-accurate.
Proof. We need simply control four sources of error, which we do in turn. Suppose that the
algorithm halts and outputs an answer computed from epoch ĵ.
We first consider the effects of sample error, namely, the difference between the statistic among
those individuals approached in an epoch (not just those who accepted our offer) and the true value
of the statistic in the underlying population.
Lemma 3.4. Except with probability at most 1/12, for each epoch j ≤ ĵ we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
EpochSize(j)
∑
xi∈Epochj
Q(xi)− E
D
[Q(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
α
4
.
Proof. This follows from a Chernoff bound and a union bound. Because the individuals in each
epoch are sampled i.i.d. from D, by the additive version of the Chernoff bound, we have for each
epoch j:
Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
EpochSize(j)
∑
xi∈Epochj
Q(xi)− E
D
[Q(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
α
4

 ≤ 2 exp(−1
8
· EpochSize(j) · α2
)
= 2exp
(
−
100
8
log(j + 1)
)
=
2
(j + 1)100/8
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By a union bound, we now have:
Pr

max
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
EpochSize(j)
∑
xi∈Epochj
Q(xi)− E
D
[Q(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
α
4

 ≤ ĵ∑
j=1
2
(j + 1)100/8
≤
∞∑
j=1
2
(j + 1)100/8
<
1
12
We next consider the impact of the noise added for the purpose of maintaining differential
privacy in the Harassment Mechanism.
Lemma 3.5. Except with probability at most 1/12, for each epoch j ≤ ĵ we have:
|νj | ≤
α
8
· EpochSize(j)
Proof. By the properties of the Laplace distribution, if random variable Y ∼ Lap(b), then: Pr[|Y | ≥
t · b] = exp(−t). By a union bound, we have:
Pr
[
max
j
|νj| ≥
α
8
· EpochSize(j)
]
≤
∞∑
j=1
Pr
[
|νj | ≥
α
8
· EpochSize(j)
]
=
∞∑
j=1
exp
(
−
100
8
log(j + 1)
)
=
∞∑
j=1
(
1
j + 1
)100/8
<
1
12
Note that there is an additional loss of accuracy due to the fact that we target only a (1−α/8)
participation level in each epoch.
We must also consider the impact of the differential privacy guarantee we give on the statistic
output by the Estimation Mechanism.
Lemma 3.6. Except with probability at most 1/12, we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣â−
∑
xi∈AcceptedSetj
Q(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
α
4
EpochSize(ĵ)
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Proof. By the properties of the Laplace distribution, we have:
Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣â−
∑
xi∈AcceptedSetj
Q(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
α
4
EpochSize(ĵ)

 = exp(−100
4
log(ĵ + 1)
)
=
(
1
ĵ + 1
)100/4
<
1
12
We can now finish the proof. Except with probability 3 · 112 =
1
4 , the conclusions of all of the
previous 3 lemmas hold. We therefore have by the triangle inequality:
∣∣∣∣∣ âEpochSize(ĵ) − ED[Q(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ âEpochSize(ĵ) −
∑
xi∈AcceptedSetj
Q(xi)
EpochSize(ĵ)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
xi∈AcceptedSetj
Q(xi)
EpochSize(ĵ)
−
∑
xi∈Epochj
Q(xi)
EpochSize(ĵ)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
EpochSize(j)
∑
xi∈Epochj
Q(xi)− E
D
[Q(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
α
4
+
α
4
+
α
4
<α,
which completes the proof.
Note that we have made no attempt to optimize the constants in this section.
3.4 Benchmark Comparison
In this section we compare the cost of our mechanism to the cost of an omniscient mechanism that
is constrained to make envy-free offers and achieve θ(α)-accuracy. For the purposes of the cost
comparison, in this section we assume that the individuals our algorithm approaches have linear
cost functions: ci(ε) = viε for some vi ∈ R
+.
We will use a result of Ghosh and Roth, translated into our setting.
Theorem 3.7 ([GR11]). Let 0 < α < 1. Given any finite sample of size n, any differentially
private mechanism that is α/4 accurate must select a set of agents H ⊆ [n] such that:
1. εi ≥
1
αn for all i ∈ H
2. |H| ≥ (1− α)n
Let v(α) be the smallest value v such that Prxi∼D[vi ≤ v] ≥ 1−α. In other words, (v(α) ·2ε, ε, ε)
is the cheapest take-it-or-leave-it offer for ε-units of privacy that in the underlying population
distribution would be accepted with probability at least 1− α, It follows immediately that:
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Observation 3.1. Any (α/32)-accurate mechanism that makes the same take-it-or-leave-it offer
to every individual xi ∼ D must in expectation pay in total at least Θ(
v(α
8
)
α ). Note that because here
we assume cost functions are linear, this quantity is fixed independent of the number of agents the
mechanism draws from D.
Proof. Note that if the benchmark algorithm were to incur sample error, this would only strengthen
our lower bound.
By Theorem 3.7, any α/32-accurate algorithm must offer a high enough price to get a partic-
ipation rate of at least (1 − α/8) at a privacy level of at least ε = 32/(αn). The cost for such
a participation rate is 32/(α · n) · v(α/8) by the definition of v. Suppose the mechanism sam-
ples n individuals. Then the mechanism must in expectation pay v(α/8) · 32/(αn) to n(1 − α/8)
individuals.
We now bound the expected cost of our mechanism, and compare it to our benchmark cost,
BenchMarkCost = Θ(
v(α
8
)
α )
Theorem 3.8. The total expected cost of our mechanism is at most:
E[MechanismCost] = O
(
log log (α · v(α/8)) · BenchMarkCost +
1
α2
)
= O
(
log log
(
α2 · BenchMarkCost
)
· BenchMarkCost +
1
α2
)
Remark 3.1. Note that the additive 1/α2 term is necessary only in the case in which v(α/8) ≤
(1 + η)/α: i.e., only in the case in which the very first offer will be accepted by a 1− α/8 fraction
of players with high probability. In this case, we have started off offering too much money, right off
the bat. An additive term is necessary, intuitively, because we cannot compete with the benchmark
cost in the case in which the benchmark cost is arbitrarily small.3
Proof. Let j∗ be the minimum epoch number such that the price offered is at least v (α/8) ε0 =
αv(α/8): pj∗ = (1 + η)
j∗ ≥ v(α/8) · α. This is the first round at which the price offered is high
enough to guarantee an expected rate of participation above (1−α/8). Note that if j∗ > 1 we also
have pj∗ ≤ (1 + η)v(α/8) · α. Our proof will proceed by arguing that E[MechanismCost] is within
a small constant factor of the cost incurred during epoch j∗.
We first argue that the total cost incurred during all epochs j < j∗ is comparable to the
cost incurred at epoch j∗, which is at most: (1 + η)j
∗
· EpochSize(j∗). We will write Cost(i) =
pi · |AcceptedSeti| to denote the total cost of epoch i. Therefore by the definition of j
∗ we have in
the case in which j∗ > 1:
Cost(j∗) ≤ (1 + η)v(α/8)α ·
(
log j∗ + 1
α2
)
= Θ
(
v(α/8) log j∗
α
)
= Θ
(
v(α/8) log log(α · v(α/8))
α
)
= Θ(log log(α · v(α/8)) · BenchMarkCost)
3We thank Lisa Fleischer and Yu-Han Lyu for pointing out the need for the additive term.
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In the case in which j∗ = 1, we have Cost(j∗) = (1 + η) · EpochSize(1) = O(1/α2). Thus, in both
cases we have:
Cost(j∗) ≤ O
(
log log(α · v(α/8)) · BenchMarkCost +
1
α2
)
Therefore, the theorem will be proven if we can argue that E[MechanismCost] = O(Cost(j∗)).
The remainder of the proof will establish this claim.
Theorem 3.9. E[MechanismCost] = O(Cost(j∗)) whenever η is a constant such that c1 < η <
3
17 − c2 where c1 and c2 are constants bounded away from 0.
Proof. We first argue that the contribution to the cost of epochs j < j∗ is small.
Lemma 3.10.
j∗−1∑
i=1
Cost(i) ≤
(1 + η)j
∗
η
· EpochSize(j∗)
Proof.
j∗−1∑
i=1
Cost(i) =
j∗−1∑
i=1
(1 + η)i|AcceptedSeti|
≤ EpochSize(j∗)
j∗−1∑
i=1
(1 + η)i
<
(1 + η)j
∗
η
· EpochSize(j∗)
We next argue that the contribution to the expected cost of the algorithm of epochs j > j∗ is
small.
Lemma 3.11. For any epoch j > j∗, the probability that the algorithm reaches epoch t before
halting is at most (17/20)t−j
∗
.
Proof. First recall that by definition of j∗, we have for any j > j∗
Pr
xi∼D
[xi accepts (pj , ε0, ε0)] ≥ 1− α/8
We therefore have:
Pr[|AcceptedSetj| < (1− α/8) · EpochSize(j)− 1] ≤
1
2
Note that round j will be the final round if EpochSize(j) + νj ≥ (1− α/8)EpochSize(j).
Conditioned on the event |AcceptedSetj | ≥ (1−α/8)·EpochSize(j)−1, we have by the properties
of the Laplace distribution:
Pr[EpochSize(j) + νj ≥ (1− α/8)EpochSize(j)] ≥
1
2
· exp(−ε0) ≥
3
10
Therefore, each round j > j∗ is the final round with probability at least 3/20. Since each of these
events is independent, the probability that the algorithm does not halt before epoch t is at most
(17/20)t−j
∗
as desired.
15
Write Hj for the event that the mechanism does not halt before round j. The expected cost of
the mechanism is then at most:
j∗∑
i=1
Cost(i)+
∞∑
j=j∗+1
(1 + η)j · EpochSize(j) · Pr[Hj]
≤
(1 + η)j
∗
η
· EpochSize(j∗) +
∞∑
j=j∗+1
(1 + η)j · EpochSize(j) · Pr[Hj]
≤
(1 + η)j
∗
η
· EpochSize(j∗) +
∞∑
j=j∗+1
(1 + η)j · EpochSize(j) · (17/20)j−j
∗
= O
(
(1 + η)j
∗
η
· EpochSize(j∗)
)
whenever there exist constants c1, c2 bounded away from 0 such that c1 < η <
3
17 − c2.
Therefore, we have shown that
E[MechanismCost] = O(Cost(j∗)) = O
(
log log(α · v(α/8)) · BenchMarkCost +
1
α2
)
which completes the proof.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we have proposed a method for accurately estimating a statistic from a population
that experiences cost as a function of their privacy loss. The statistics we consider here take the form
of the expectation of some predicate over the population. We leave to future work the consideration
of other, nonlinear, statistics. We have circumvented the impossibility result of [GR11] by using a
mechanism empowered with the ability to approach individuals and make them take-it-or-leave-it
offers (instead of relying on a direct revelation mechanism), and by relaxing the measure by which
individuals experience privacy loss. Moving away from direct revelation mechanisms seems to us
to be inevitable: if costs for privacy can be correlated with private data, then merely asking for
individuals to report their costs is inevitably disclosive, for any reasonable measure of privacy. On
the other hand, we do not claim that the model we use for how individuals experience cost as a
function of privacy is “the” right one. Nevertheless, we have argued that some relaxation away from
individuals experiencing privacy cost entirely as a function of the differential privacy parameter of
the entire mechanism is inevitable (as made particularly clear in the setting of take-it-or-leave-it
offers, in which individuals in this model would accept arbitrarily low offers). In particular, we
believe that the style of survey mechanism presented in this paper, in which the mechanism may
approach individuals with take-it-or-leave-it offers, is realistic, and any reasonable model for how
individuals value their privacy should predict reasonable behavior in the face of such a mechanism.
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